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REMEDYING SYSTEMIC SEX DISCRIMINATION  
BY GENDER QUOTAS: JUST BECAUSE 
 
Tracy A. Thomas* 
 
 When newly-elected Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was asked by surprised 
reporters why he appointed women as fifty percent of his new cabinet, he responded simply, 
“Because it’s 2015.”1  Just because.  Because it’s time.  In fact, he suggested, it is long past time 
for having to justify including women as one-half of the power structure when women constitute 
one-half of the population.  And it’s time for meaningful change in shared governance by 
something as pragmatically simple as selecting fifteen women and fifteen men for 
appointments.2  
Similarly, it is long past time for justifying the need to reform American institutions that 
exclude women from the power structure.  Rather than stumbling along the path of continued sex 
discrimination by the ineffective application of judicial band-aids to systemic problems, it is time 
for alteration of the power structure itself.  It’s time for the law to endorse the equal 
representation of women in all power venues in order to remedy—permanently—longstanding 
and resistant, systemic sex discrimination.3 And the way to get there might be quotas. 
                                                 
* Associate Dean for Institutional Excellence, Seiberling Chair of Constitutional Law, The University of Akron 
School of Law. 
1 Elliott Hannon, Canada’s New Prime Minister Says He Picked a Cabinet That’s Half Women “Because It’s 2015,” 
SLATE, Nov. 4, 2015, at 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slatest/2015/11/04/canada_s_justin_trudeau_s_gender_equal_cabinet_because_it_s
_2015.html; Natasha Young, This World Leader Has the Perfect Response to Why Feminism Matters, Jan. 25, 2016, 
http://www.refinery29.com/2016/01/101912/canada-prime-minister-says-everyone-should-be-a-feminist.  
2 Trudeau explained, “I personally convinced a number of extraordinary women to step forward, as well as a number 
of extraordinary men, at a time when politics can be very very divisive.”  Jill Treanor & Graeme Wearden, Embrace 
Feminism to Improve Decision-Making, Trudeau Says, GUARDIAN, Jan. 22, 2016, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/22/embrace-feminism-to-improve-decision-making-says-justin-trudeau 
3 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Renewed Equal Rights Amendment: Now More Than Ever, 37 HARVARD J. 
LAW & GENDER 569 (2014); MARTHA CHAMMALLAS & JENNIFER WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, 
GENDER AND TORT LAW (2010). 
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 “Quota” is a dirty word.  In U.S law and society, we are “quota-phobic,” vehemently 
resisting an idea alleged to be based on political correctness in place of merit.4  Quotas have been 
used in affirmative-action remedies to integrate schools racially in proportion to the community 
or to mandate a set percentage of government contractors of minority status.5 And quotas have 
been overturned by the Supreme Court as discriminatory in and of themselves.6  However, 
quotas are much more accepted in other countries, particularly Europe, where gender quotas for 
corporate boards, political representatives, and academic review boards are increasingly 
commonplace.7  “In many jurisdictions around the world, women's past and current disadvantage 
is regarded as an injustice that must be corrected by various measures, including 
antidiscrimination law, affirmative action, and even gender quotas.”8  It is thus worth 
reconsidering gender quotas as a potential remedy in America.   
Quotas offer the power to change the big picture of systemic discrimination.  For at the 
broad level, sex discrimination is still apparent.  Women constitute 50.8% of the American 
population.9  Yet, women are 47% of law students, but 34% of lawyers, 18% of equity partners, 
25% of judges, 20% of law deans, and 25% of lawmakers.10  Women earn 57% of all bachelor’s 
                                                 
4 See Darren Rosenblum, Loving Gender Balance: Reframing Identity-Based Inequality Remedies, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2873, 2884 (2008). 
5 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
6 Parents Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); 
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
7 Julie C. Suk, Gender Quotas After the End of Men, 93 B.U.L. Rev. 1123 (2013). 
8 Id. at 1124. 
9 U.S. Census Bureau, Quick Facts, July 1, 2014. 
10 ABA Commission on Women, Statistics, A Current Glance at Women in the Law (July 2014),  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current_glance_statistics_july2014.authcheckdam.p
df; Lauren Stiller Rickleen, Women Partners Continue to Lag Behind Male Colleagues, National Association of 
Women Lawyers Annual Survey Report (2015),  
file:///C:/Users/thomast/Downloads/NAWL%202015%20SURVEY_FINAL.pdf; Women in State Legislatures for 
2015, http://www.ncsl.org/legislators-staff/legislators/womens-legislative-network/women-in-state-legislatures-for-
2015.aspx; Women in U.S. Congress 2015 (20%), http://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/women-us-congress-2015; see also 
Amber Phillips, The Sad State of Black Women in State Political Office, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2015, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/05/the-sad-state-of-black-women-in-statewide-political-
office/ (reporting that black women are 7.4% of the population, but 3.5% of the legislators and 1% of mayors). 
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degrees, 50% of science degrees, but are only 25% of the STEM workforce.11  And women are 
47% of the workforce, 55% of business consumers, 40% of MBAs, 40% of business managers, 
but less than 20% of corporate boards and 15% of Chief Executive Officers.12  The courts 
receive continued filings of sex discrimination complaints, not due to facially-discriminatory 
rules like nineteenth-century coverture, but due to practices and informal norms of exclusion and 
denial of opportunity just the same.13  Laws directed at malevolent individual bad actors miss the 
picture, and fail to redress the more complex and embedded systemic bias, structural 
impediments, and gendered norms that continue to fuel gender inequality.14  Discriminatory 
harms of gender inequality in employment, education, marriage, religion, pregnancy, and 
profession have existed since the founding of our country, and women’s demands for eradication 
of such wrongs since the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments have not yet been realized.15  Two 
hundred years of harm, and more than fifty years of modern feminist legal reform are more than 
enough to dispel the notion that the status quo is sufficient or that more basic measures should 
first be tried.  
 It’s time to consider more effective, systemic, and long-lasting remedies of gender 
quotas.  A quota remedy would require gender parity—proportional representation of women in 
positions of power.  The proportion would match the gender distribution of the general 
                                                 
11 State of Girls and Women in STEM, Nat’l Girls Collaborative Project, https://ngcproject.org/statistics.  
12 Women in the Professional Workforce, Feb. 2015, http://dpeaflcio.org/professionals/professionals-in-the-
workplace/women-in-the-professional-and-technical-labor-force; Marcus Noland & Tyler Moran, Study: Firms With 
More Women in the C-Suite are More Profitable, HARV. BUS. REV., Feb. 8, 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/02/study-
firms-with-more-women-in-the-c-suite-are-more-profitable; Kitty Lindsay, Coca-Cola CEO Touts Feminist 
Business Model as Secret to Success, MS. BLOG, Dec. 3, 2015 (noting that women comprise 70 percent of Coke 
drinkers, but only two board members and fewer than 20 senior leadership positions at the corporation) 
http://msmagazine.com/blog/2015/12/03/coca-cola-ceo-touts-feminist-business-model-as-secret-to-success/.  
13 E.g., Young v. United Parcel Service, 575 US _ (2015): Bolton v. Lynch, No. 2:15-CV-294 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 21, 
2015). 
14 Anne L. Alstott, Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards: Options for Legal Design in the United States, 26 PACE 
INT’L L. REV. 38, 39 (2014); MacKinnon, supra; CHAMMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra. 
15 Declaration of Sentiments, in Proceedings of the First Convention on Woman’s Rights, Seneca Falls, New York, 
July 14 & 15, 1848.  
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population; so women as about 51% of the population should constitute 51% of the managers, 
boards, CEOs, legislatures, and law firm partners, as well as STEM majors and law students.  
Judges too, would then be 51% women, although Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg suggested she 
would not stop there, opining that the Supreme Court would have the right number of women 
justices “When there are nine.”16  This idea of substantial proportionality is seen in the law in the 
Title IX education context where one sex is deemed underrepresented if there is a disparity 
between the gender composition of the institution’s study body and the gender composition of its 
athletics.17  This mandate of parity and proportional representation is exists legally as a tenet of 
gender equality.  One way to enforce such parity is through quotas, requiring a parallel 
representation between population and power.  
 The idea of gender quotas seems farfetched at first blush.  Culturally, it evokes claims of 
unfairness, triggering fears of unqualified candidates and reverse discrimination.18  (Though such 
fear itself reveals a deep gender bias in assuming women collectively would be unqualified).19  
There is also a concern about their counter-effect, for example, limiting women to 51% of 
college admissions even though their grades should place them at a much higher percent over 
men.20  Legally, the current Supreme Court seems to have foreclosed quotas, at least in the racial 
                                                 
16 SALLY KENNEY, GENDER & JUSTICE: WHY WOMEN IN THE JUDICIARY REALLY MATTER (2012); When Will There 
Be Enough Women on the Supreme Court? Justice Ginsburg Answers That Question, PBS NewsHour, Feb. 5, 2015, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/will-enough-women-supreme-court-justice-ginsburg-answers-question/; Debra 
Cassens Weiss, Justice Ginsburg Says Nine Women on the Supreme Court Would be Enough, ABA J., Oct. 27, 
2010. 
17 Cohen v. Brown University, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993); Rosenblum, supra, at 2883-84; Deborah Brake, The 
Struggle for Sex Equality in Sport and The Theory Behind Title IX, 34 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 13 (2000). 
18 Peta Spender, Gender Quotas on Boards—Is It Time for Australia to Lean In?, 20 DEAKIN L. REV. 95, 101 (2015); 
Ruth Sullivan, Can Gender Quotas Get More Women in the Boardroom?, July 1, 2015, www.bloomberg.com;  
Susan Smith Blakely, Boosting Diversity Through Quotas—Is This a Good Idea for Women Lawyers?, Ms. JD Blog, 
Apr. 20, 2015, http://ms-jd.org/blog/article/boosting-diversity-through-quotas-is-this-a-good-idea-for-women-
lawyers?utm_content=buffer39b8c&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer;  
19 For a humorous take on such gendered assumptions, see Twitter @manwhohasitall, Nov. 8, 2015 (“I have 
absolutely nothing against male bank managers, as long as they have some grasp of financial matters.”).  
20 Suk, supra, 1134-39 (discussing the Swedish example of college admissions). 
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context.21  However, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissenting from the Court’s racial affirmative 
action cases, distinguished the use of race in a “color conscious” way “to prevent discrimination 
being perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.”22  She cited contemporary 
human rights documents, including international treaties against gender discrimination, as laws 
that “draw just this line” and “distinguish between policies of oppression and measures designed 
to accelerate de facto equality.”23 
The quota idea might not be so crazy, however, when examined from a perspective of the 
law of Remedies.  This law requires a meaningful remedy for every harm, and provides the 
flexibility necessary to achieve tangible change.24  As discussed in Part I, existing individualized 
remedies have been inadequate to redress the entrenched problems of systemic gender 
discrimination.25  Institutional and structural problems of inequality have not responded to the 
innocuous band-aids of damages and reinstatement, even if plaintiffs make it through the 
gauntlet of limitations on class actions and collective relief and laws that fail to encapsulate 
gendered harms.26  Second, as discussed in Part II, legal systems in other countries have 
recognized this entrenched ineffectiveness and have moved on to mandating quotas for 
meaningful and accelerated change.27 This precedent provides support for remedial options that 
                                                 
21 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
22 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 302 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
23 Id. at 302; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Article 4 of CEDAW, the United 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, explicitly states that 
“temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between men and women shall not be 
considered discrimination as defined in the present Convention.” 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 
1981). 
24 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803); Tracy A. Thomas, Restriction of Tort Remedies and the Constraints of 
Due Process: The Right to an Adequate Remedy, 39 AKRON L. REV. 975 (2006); Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi 
Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633 (2004). 
25 See infra. 
26 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. ___ (2011) (denying class action certification for national class of 
women employees claiming sex discrimination in employment). 
27 See infra. 
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force institutional change in conformance with the legal mandates of gender equality.  Part III 
then argues that quotas are legally viable under the remedial law of prophylaxis and withstand 
judicial constitutional scrutiny.28  It is worth consideration of these judicial options in order to 
provide new approaches to old problems.  Because it’s time. 
 
I. The Problem: Continued Harms and Inadequate Remedies 
The foundational premise detailed by feminist scholars is that individualized remedies 
fail to sufficiently address systemic causes and effects of sex discrimination.29  Examples of the 
continuing system harms as seen in the daily news, where sexist systems operate in a microcosm, 
and legal slaps fail to make any difference.  For example, executive Ellen Pao encountered the 
old boys club of Silicon Valley with its gendered assumptions about women, viewing female 
colleagues as potential sexual conquests, with management by paternalistic fatherly figures who 
failed to equally support women’s power and advancement.30  The subtleties of engrained norms 
failed to demonstrate to a jury that the problem was more than one woman’s promotion, but 
rather about workplace expectations, daily treatment, workplace relations, and standards for 
advancement all defined by Mad-Men era norms of masculinity.  In another example, a woman 
federal prosecutor in Washington State, the high-ranking Deputy Criminal Chief, faced an uphill 
battle to prove sex discrimination by her unequal pay, isolation, and lack of authority in the 
workplace based on individual intent rather than systemic male-norms of workplace 
                                                 
28 See infra. 
29 CHAMMALLS & WRIGGINS, supra; MacKinnon, supra. 
30 David Streitfeld, Ellen Pao Loses Silicon Valley Bias Case Against Kleiner Perkins, NY TIMES, Mar. 27, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/28/technology/ellen-pao-kleiner-perkins-case-decision.html?_r=0; Cassidy 
Tucker, Pao ’91 Loses Discrimination Lawsuit, DAILY PRINCETONIAN, Mar. 29, 2015, 
http://dailyprincetonian.com/news/2015/03/pao-91-loses-discrimination-lawsuit/.   
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management.31  Glass ceilings and workplace cultures have been resistant to the damages claims 
of any one individual.   
The feminist insight as to these systemic problems is the importance of power.32  The 
lack of women’s power as decision makers in the workplace, politics, or science means the 
perpetuation of the patriarchy (yes patriarchy) and male privilege from the top down. 
Generations at the top may be outdated, but they continue to transmit the same outmoded 
assumptions, reinvigorating a new generation with the same discriminatory norms and practices. 
  Scholars have discussed the inadequacy of existing remedies for gender discrimination in 
the tort damages context. “When viewed through a wider cultural lens, the basic structure of 
contemporary tort law still tends to reflect and reinforce the social marginalization of women and 
racial minorities and to place a lower value on their lives, activities, and potential.”33  Non-
pecuniary damages are limited for emotional, dignitary, or intangible harms.  “The privileged 
status of physical harm over emotional and relational injury found in contemporary tort law is 
sustained by dubious assumptions about the greater seriousness and important of this type of 
injury in the lives of ordinary people.”34  Legal standards of tort ask “what is reasonable” of the 
objective person, incorporating men who have not experienced discrimination, the lack of 
privilege, second-class status, or emotional toll, thereby rendering reactions to these 
consequences automatically unreasonable.  Thus, remedies fail to correct action or provide 
incentives or leverage against discriminatory action. “Under the status-quo, tort law’s remedial 
damage scheme both perpetuates existing racial and gender inequalities and creates ex-ante 
                                                 
31 Bolton v. Lynch, No. 2:15-CV-294 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 21, 2015); Kip Hill, Female Ex-Federal Prosecutor Files 
Gender Discrimination Lawsuit, THE SPOKESMAN REV., Oct. 21, 2015, 
http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2015/oct/21/female-prosecutor-in-us-attorneys-office-in-spokan.  
32 Feminist Perspectives on Power, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Mar. 9, 2011), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminist-power/.  
33 CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra. 
34 Id.  
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incentives for potential tortfeasers to engage in future discriminatory harm (discriminatory 
targeting) towards women and minorities.”35 
 Elsewhere in the law, it is difficult to prove systemic gendered harm based on proof, jury 
bias, and new limitations of class action cases.36  Even when systemic violations are established, 
the Supreme Court has been reluctant to award relief.  For example, in Manhart v. Department of 
Power, the Court found systemic denial from overcharging women for their retirement plan, but 
denied restitution and return of the wrongfully charged monies.37  Even though the general legal 
rule was that Title VII remedies should “make the plaintiff whole.”  And even though in a similar 
case two years earlier, the Court did award such relief to remedy men’s unequal retirement 
benefits resulting from a longer work time to retirement.38 The all-male Court was concerned 
with institutional problems of defendant’s solvency and impact on third parties, even where the 
defendant admitted it had sufficient existing funds to pay.39  Governments and third parties were 
all weighed higher in the remedial calculus than the women who had proven discrimination. 
  A glimmer of remedial hope was seen in the creation of sexual harassment remedies.  A 
series of prophylactic injunctive remedies in the 1980s turned workplace culture from Mad Men 
era to zero tolerance.40  Prophylactic provisions reaching facilitators of continued harm and 
requiring institutional change were more effective than meager damages in not only shifting the 
culture in defendant’s workplace, but in bringing about broader cultural shifts in norms and 
acceptable behavior.41  Relief like institutional reporting and grievance structures, education of 
                                                 
35 Ronen Avraham, Is Race- and Sex-Based Targeting Efficient? A Closer Look at Tort Law’s Discriminatory 
Damage Awards, available at www.ssrn.com. 
36 Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. ___ (2011). 
37 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Tracy A. Thomas, Manhart, in THE U.S. FEMINIST JUDGMENTS PROJECT (Cambridge Press 
2016). 
38 Id.; see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 455 (1976). 
39 435 U.S. at 720-23. 
40 Thomas, Continued Vitality, supra, at 119. 
41 Id. 
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institutional behavior, and establishment of policies made the difference.  As a corollary, the 
courts developed a safe harbor for corporate defendants who adopted these institutional changes, 
insulating them from vicarious liability for punitive damages for the bad acts of employees.42  
The key was that courts realized that continuing to slap down individual aggressors and award 
personal damages for lost income and emotional distress were severely inadequate to changing 
the gendered and sexualized workplace culture.  Instead, proactive, injunctive relief altering the 
institutional structure and the power itself was required.   
 
II. Precedent for Solutions: Go Big or Go Home 
 The rest of the world is ahead of the U.S. on the idea of gender quotas.  Quotas, 
sometimes phrased as the softer, and more palatable term “targets,” have been adopted in many 
European contexts over the past twenty years in order to redress discrimination and restructure 
power including corporate boards, legislative bodies, and ivory towers.43  “Quotas represent a 
fast-track policy measure, in contrast to the well-known incremental-track model according to 
which gender equality will come in due time as a country develops. . . . [G]ender quotas are a 
simple answer to a very complex problem, that of women’s historical exclusion” from political 
and private systems of power.44  
 Gender quotas for corporate boards have received the most attention in America.45  It 
began with Norway’s mandate adopted a decade ago requiring 40% women on governing boards 
                                                 
42 Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526, 545–46 (1999). 
43 Gender Quotas: Vital for Equality or Mere Tokens? THE WEEK, May 15, 2015, 
http://www.theweek.co.uk/63678/gender-quotas-vital-for-equality-or-mere-tokenism (UK adopted “targets” not 
“quotas”). 
44 SUSAN FRANCESCHET, ET. AL., EDS., THE IMPACT OF GENDER QUOTAS vii (2012). 
45 See, e.g., Julie C. Suk, Gender Quotas After the End of Men, 93 B.U.L. REV. 1123 (2013); Anne L. Alstott, 
Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards: Options for Legal Design in the United States, 26 PACE INT’L L. REV. 38, 39 
(2014); Deborah L Rhode & Amanda K Packel, Diversity on Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does 
Difference Make? 39 DELAWARE J. CORP. LAW 377, 383 (2014); Julie C Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: 
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of companies and enforced by penalties.  Other countries including Germany, France, as well as 
the European Union have adopted gender quotas for corporate boards, requiring companies to 
have anywhere from 20 to 40 percent women directors.46 In the United States, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission requires companies to report the percentage of board members by gender, 
but nothing further.47 
Quotas for gender have also been adopted in over one hundred countries for elections in 
Europe, Asia, and African.  These electoral quotas typically require a certain percent of political 
candidates be women, ranging from 20 to 50 percent.48  The argument for electoral quotas is that 
women must be “a ‘critical minority’ of 30 to 40 percent of the decision-making body to have an 
influential voice and to make substantive contributions to the legislative process.”49 Advocates of 
electoral quotas do not want simply to increase the number of women in office, but also 
“diversify the types of women elected, raise attention to women’s issues in policy making, 
change the gendered nature of the public sphere, and inspire female voters to become more 
politically active.”50 
                                                 
From Public Office to Corporate Boards, 10 INT’L J. CON. LAW 449, 452 (2012); Larelle Chapple & Jacquelyn E 
Humphrey, Does Board Gender Diversity Have a Financial Impact? Evidence Using Stock Portfolio Performance, 
122 J. BUS. ETHICS 709, 711 (2014); Kevin Campbell & Antonio Minguez-Vera, Gender Diversity in the 
Boardroom and Firm Financial Performance, 83 J. BUS. ETHICS 435 (2008) (finding that greater gender diversity on 
boards increased firm values); Valentina Zarya, New Proof That More Female Bosses Equals Higher Profits, 
FORTUNE, Feb. 8, 2016, http://fortune.com/2016/02/08/women-leadership-profits/ 
46 Suk, End of Men, supra, at 1125-26 (noting European Commission rule prohibiting any sex to have more than 
60% representation on corporate board); Sullivan, supra; Spender, supra, at 110-11 (describing the examples of 
France, 40 percent by 2016, 20 percent as interim measure; Australia, 40 percent targets for public sector boards);  
47 AARON A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY: CORPORATE LAW, GOVERNANCE, AND DIVERSITY 
(2015). 
48 FRANCESCHET, supra, vii, 3-5 (these include reserved seats, party quotas, and legislative quotas); Suk, supra, 
1126; Anisa A. Somani, Note, The Use of Gender Quotas in America: Are Voluntary Party Quotas the Way to Go?, 
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1451 (2013); Lisa Baldez, Elected Bodies: The Gender Quota Law for Legislative 
Candidates in Mexico (2004), http://www.quotaproject.org/aboutQuotas.cfm.  
49 Somani, supra, at 1153, 1155 (citing the successful example of Rwanda which incorporated a gender quota into its 
constitution in 2003, reserving at least 30 percent of the seats for women, and now ranks highest among all countries 
for its level of female political representation in its national legislature, with women comprising 56 percent of the 
lower house and 39 percent of the upper house). 
50 FRANCESCHET, supra, 3. 
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An increasing number of countries are also using gender quotas for scientific committees, 
to assess and award academic tenure and promotion.51  “The underrepresentation of women in 
academia remains a cause for concern among universities and policy makers around the world. 
In Europe, women account for 46% of PhD graduates, 37% of associate professors and only a 
mere 20% of full professors.”52  One contributing cause identified for this gender disparity has 
been all-male evaluation panels, and thus “a number of countries have introduced quotas 
requiring the presence of at least 40% of women (and men) in scientific committees.”53  
 A key question debated with all of these mandates is what difference, if any, the gender 
quotas make.  Arguments are made as to substantively different outcomes that might result.  The 
business case for gender-balanced corporate boards is that companies’ bottom lines, financial 
performance, and shareholder profits improve when women direct.54  Other studies find that 
boards are more active when they are gender-balanced, and thus provide better productivity and 
CEO oversight.55  These performance conclusions are sometimes explained by gender 
                                                 
51Manuel Bagues, et. al, Does the Gender Composition of Scientific Committees Matter?, July 8, 2015, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2628176.  
52 Id. at *2. 
53 Finland introduced gender quotas in 1995 through the amendment of the Finnish Act on 
Equality between Women and Men. In 1999, the European Commission stated the aim to achieve at 
least a 40% representation of women in Marie Curie scholarships, advisory groups, assessment panels 
and monitoring panels. In 2007, gender quotas were introduced in Spain within the Equality Law.  More recently in 
2014, France has also introduced quotas in all scientific committees.  Id. at *4 n.5. 
54 DHIR, supra (study of Norwegian quota model demonstrates the important role diversity can play in enhancing the 
quality of corporate governance); Alstott, supra, at 42; Linda-Eling Lee, et al., Women on Boards: Global Trends in 
Gender Diversity on Corporate Boards, MSCI, Nov. 2015, https://www.msci.com/documents/10199/04b6f646-
d638-4878-9c61-4eb91748a82b; Spender, supra, at 106; Deborah L Rhode & Amanda K Packel, Diversity on 
Corporate Boards: How Much Difference Does Difference Make? 39 DELAWARE J. CORP. LAW 377, 383 (2014); 
Julie C Suk, Gender Parity and State Legitimacy: From Public Office to Corporate Boards, 10 INT’L J. CON. LAW 
449, 452 (2012); Larelle Chapple & Jacquelyn E Humphrey, Does Board Gender Diversity Have a Financial 
Impact? Evidence Using Stock Portfolio Performance, 122 J. BUS. ETHICS 709, 711 (2014); Kevin Campbell & 
Antonio Minguez-Vera, Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Financial Performance, 83 J. BUS. ETHICS 
435 (2008) (finding that greater gender diversity on boards increased firm values); Valentina Zarya, New Proof That 
More Female Bosses Equals Higher Profits, FORTUNE, Feb. 8, 2016, http://fortune.com/2016/02/08/women-
leadership-profits/ (discussing new study concluding that companies with 30% female leaders have net profit 
margins up to 6% higher); Noland & Moran, supra.   
55 Miriam Schwartz-Ziv, Gender and Board Activeness: The Role of a Critical Mass, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS (forthcoming); Miriam Schwartz-Ziv, Gender and Board Activeness: The Role of a Critical Mass, The 
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essentialist thinking that women are more risk adverse, less likely to engage in fraudulent 
activity, and consensus focused.56  As Prime Minister Trudeau put it, “Let’s start rewarding 
politicians and companies who aren’t driven by a macho approach.”57 
In another context, researchers have worked to prove that women judges reach different 
results.  Some studies show more favorable decisions to plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases or 
more sympathetic rulings to plaintiffs in immigration cases.58  Other studies show no measurable 
substantive difference in outcome for from female judges.59  Still others argue that the full 
substantive impact of women in power is not yet realized because we are nowhere near the point 
of shared power of 50/50 at which women have the authority to make a meaningful difference.60 
 However, “while functionalist arguments dominate the literature and the debate” over 
gender quotas, “the most enduring justifications are normative, and based on equality, parity and 
democracy.”61  Functionalist arguments contend that women make a measurable difference to 
performance, but this is not necessarily the point.  The reason for requiring gender quotas is not 
for any particular outcome, but for shared power and procedural legitimacy.  The normative and 
                                                 
CLS Blue Sky Blog, Feb. 9, 2016, http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/02/09/gender-and-board-activeness-the-
role-of-a-critical-mass/.  
56 Alstott, supra, at 42; Spender, supra, at 106. 
57 Treanor & Graeme Wearden, supra. 
58 Christina L. Boyd, Lee Epstein, and Andrew Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging, 54 AMER. 
J. POL. SCI. 389 (2010) (finding the probability of a judge deciding in favor of the party alleging discrimination 
decreases by about 10 percentage points when the judge is a male, and that when a woman serves on a panel with 
men, the men are significantly more likely to rule in favor of the rights litigant); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Asylum in 
a Different Voice: Judging Immigration Claims and Gender in REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM 
ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM (Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholz & Philip G. Schrag, 
eds., NYU Press 2009) (finding female immigration judges granted asylum at a rate of 53%, while male judges 
granted asylum at a rate of 37.3%.) 
59 Rosalind Dixon, Female Justices, Feminism, and the Politics of Judicial Appointment: A Re-Examination, 21 
YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 297 (2010) (concluding in a study of Canadian judges that “the current literature on judicial 
behavior in fact reveals little if any meaningful connection between a judge’s gender and her pro-feminist views, in 
a jurisprudential sense”); see also Bagues, supra, 6 (finding no empirical support from studies in Italy and Spain “to 
suggest that a larger presence of female evaluators in the evaluation committees has a statistically or economically 
significant positive effect on the chances of success of female candidates”). 
59 Spender, supra, at 96.   
60 KENNEY, supra.  
61 Spender, supra, at 96.   
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“symbolic representation of women is sufficient” as a justification for quotas “because it signals 
a change to traditional conceptions of authority and citizenship.”62  “Symbolic representation” is 
“the concept that, when women are included in decision-making bodies and are therefore visible 
in the public sphere, this signals a change to traditional conceptions of authority, citizenship and 
norm creation.”63  As explained in the context of judicial gender quotas, the difference sought is 
not in the result per se, but in the representation in access to power, ensuring the fairness of the 
law, and more fully representing the human experience.64  Fundamental interests or norms at the 
core of our constitutional and legal rights dictate insurance against systemic discriminatory 
decisions by providing the shared power base.   
This systemic representative ideal emerged in the 1990s in the European discourse as 
“gender parity,” the representation of men and women in roughly equal numbers.  It “was 
understood to be a requirement of all legitimate institutions exercising power in a democracy 
because each sex represented half of humanity.  Thus conceived, gender balance is . . . a 
permanent feature of good governance.”65 “Parity democracy,” understood as fifty-fifty male-
female representation in all organizations exercising power in a democratic society, “is not 
primarily aimed at enhancing women's opportunities as individuals or even as a group.  Its 
primary purpose is to legitimize the larger institution's exercise of political, economic, and social 
power.”66 This is a systemic understanding of power and an incorporation of the feminist goal to 
have women be a part of that power structure. 
                                                 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 KENNEY, supra. 
65 Suk, supra, at 1129. 
66 Id. at 1130. 
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 Even if functional difference could justify gender-balanced power, such outcome 
difference is not likely to occur in advance of gender parity.  For, it is only through symbolic 
representation that functional difference even becomes possible.  “When governments reflect the 
actual demographics of the populations they are elected to represent, effective representation of 
the diverse interests of citizens is more likely.  Without women in high level government 
positions, issues that are important to women are less likely to be addressed in a meaningful 
way.”67 Women need to advance out of tokenism, beyond the tipping point of minority 
representation to a critical mass at which such substantive difference might then be possible 
(though not required).68  For tokenism, an innocuous action of requiring one women to provide 
lip service to inclusion and homogeneity, offers such minimal relief as to reflect no meaningful 
change.69  Indeed a recent study showed that such tokenism was affirmatively detrimental to 
equality, as the inclusion of one woman or minority made it harder for any other like candidates 
to be included in the power group.  Despite its ineffectiveness, tokenism remains the first-step 
approach to forcing systemic change, and even it is still resisted as a radical alteration of the 
status quo.70 Quotas offer the potential to bypass the frozen status quo and false incrementalism 
to achieve actual parity.  It thus has to be all in: quotas must be 51 percent, not watered down to 
20 percent like many of the first generation quotas.  
 Access to power is a key feminist insight, that women’s lack of power has been the 
structural block to gender equity, and that gaining access to power is an ultimate remedial goal.  
Women’s lack of power is the historical foundation still undergirding the law. The 
                                                 
67 National Women’s Law Center, “Because It’s 2015”: Canada’s Model Cabinet, Nov. 6, 2015, at www.nwlc.org.. 
68 Jasmin Joecks, Kerstin Pull & Karin Vetter, Gender Diversity in the Boardroom and Firm Performance: What 
Exactly Constitutes a “Critical Mass?” 118 J. BUS. ETHICS 61, 65 (2013).   
69 Rosenblum, supra, at 2890. 
70 Scott Jaschik, Requiring Diverse Pools, Nov. 6, 2015, www.insidehighered.com.  
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“disqualification of women as citizens in the past was a central structural feature of the modern 
state, where autonomous male individuals could only thrive or continue to reproduce themselves 
socially by requiring women to perform tasks in the private sphere.”71 Thus patriarchy and 
coverture is a foundational structure of the American legal system with continuing 
reverberations, like the legal black hole of the private sphere of domestic violence or maternity 
leave, and the male privileged sphere of the workplace.  Remedying this structural inequity is 
core to remedying the resulting and continuing harms of unequal pay, maternity discrimination, 
lack of promotion, and ineffective domestic violence enforcement.  “It is only when women 
actively participate in the public sphere in significantly large numbers that the system will be 
forced to confront and solve the problems of dependency and social reproduction” engrained in 
the public/private structure.72  It’s more than time for big change to the system of power itself. 
 
III. Making the Legal Case for Judicial Gender Quotas 
 Most of the European precedent on gender quota is legislative, not judicial.  Certainly the 
United States could pursue a similar legislative approach, assuming any constituencies would 
undertake its advancement.73  Even if there was political support for such a move, a legislative 
option encounters the same systemic barrier; results are constrained by the lack of decisional 
power in legislatures where women represent only 20% of lawmakers and 29% of lobbyists.74 A 
legislative solution is also often benign, because any solution that manages to achieve political 
consensus is often diluted, and fails to challenge the power balance.  For example, other 
                                                 
71 Spender, supra, 108-09. 
72 Spender, supra note, at 109. 
73 See Tracy A. Thomas, Congress' Section 5 Power and Remedial Rights, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 673 (2001) 
(explaining prophylactic, remedial legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
74 Jonathan D. Salant & Jennifer Prince, Washington’s Top Lobbying Groups Hire Mostly Men, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESS, June 12, 2012.  
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countries have passed legislative gender quotas at 20, 30, and 40%, but not at a power-shifting 
proportional level of the majority of 50%.75  
Nor or voluntary actions sufficient to remedy the systemic problems.76  Voluntary actions 
are also often mere tokenism, like the University of Texas’s recent initiative to require one 
candidate for any high-level position to be one woman or minority.77 Any increase over existing 
low representation of women at 15% and 20%, is more, but does not make a material shift in 
power, nor is it based on a theory of proportional representation.  Instead, the most successful 
mechanisms of quota systems have been that like Norway’s corporate board quota, which 
resembles a judicial remedy in its establishment of contempt-like enforcement penalties with 
warnings and fines, escalating to dissolving company.  It requires specific remedial action, rather 
than simply providing abstract guarantees.  
Affirmative action remedies have been a key way of opening up resistant institutions to 
social change.  Social justice reforms in America have been by judicial action, and are suited to 
incremental change and individual context.78  They redress harm as that harm is adjudicated in 
the specific context of established problems, rather than at the abstract level of policymaking.  
Judicial context thus provides the opportunity to consider gender quotas.  The question is 
whether such quotas would be legal.  The remedial law of prophylactic injunctions suggests that 
it could be, and arguably without violating constitutional commands of equal protection.   
 
 
                                                 
75 Suk, supra. 
76 Though one example where voluntary quotas have worked is in Sweden. There in the 1980s, the Social 
Democratic Party adopted the “zipper system” quota of alternating men and women candidates, and the Green and 
Left Parties adopted a 50 percent quota.  Sweden ranks fourth in the world for its 45 percent female representation in 
Parliament.  Somani, supra note, at 1480. 
77 Matthew Watkins, UT System to Require Interviews with Minority Candidates, TEXAS TRIB., Nov. 5, 2015. 
78 E.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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A.  Quotas as Prophylaxis 
 The remedial precedent supports the use of quotas as legitimate prophylactic 
injunctions.79 As I have discussed elsewhere, prophylactic injunctions are a particularly effective 
way to provide meaningful relief for continued harm.80  Prophylaxis addresses the facilitators of 
harm, the inputs that cause continued harm, providing flexibility and tailoring to solve the 
problem.  Because otherwise for most instances of sex discrimination, after the fact is too little 
too late.  Retrospective remedies allow the behavior to continue, perpetuating the discriminatory 
norms in society and to new generations with only a small nuisance value.  The promise of 
meaningful relief is in prophylactic remedies, getting out in front of the problem and ordering the 
defendant to take action to avert the problem, before it occurs again.  Prophylaxis can address 
contributing factors, even when that factor in and of itself, standing alone, does not violate the 
law.81  Such action changes the decision-making process that otherwise allows the gendered 
behaviors to happen in the first place.  And carries with it the potential to shift the systemic 
power dynamic itself. 
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the availability of structural and prophylactic 
relief to response to an entrenched, systemic problem unremedied by lesser remedies.82  In 
Brown v. Plata, a divided Court upheld an order to release a certain number of prisoners to 
remedy the prison overcrowding that continued to systemically cause the problems with the 
                                                 
79 Swann, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
80 Tracy A. Thomas, The Prophylactic Remedy: Normative Principles and Definitional Parameters of Broad 
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State’s inability to provide adequate medical and psychiatric care to inmates.83  As Justice 
Kennedy noted, the inadequate care, and deaths from such care, which continued unabated for 
decades, demanded more relief when the commands to improve care failed to alter the harm.84  
Thus, in situations of continued harm, courts have power to craft injunctive remedies that reach 
beyond mere cessation commands to redress the systemic problems that cause the harm.85  
The Supreme Court has also upheld a quota as a valid prophylactic injunctive remedy.  In 
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Schools, a unanimous Court upheld an order that the 
racial percentage of students in each school match the racial composition of the neighbors.86  The 
order thus mandated that each school be 71% white and 29% black.87  The Court explained the 
quota was properly within the scope of the court’s equitable discretion given the remedial target 
of the segregated school system and the total failure of any other remedy.88  The Court 
appreciated that quotas were a good “starting point” for effectuating change and provided a 
“reasonable, feasible, and workable” solution.89  
Drawing on these precedents, the idea of a gender quota seems plausible.  A gender quota 
could be ordered as a judicial option in a case to alter a power system like a corporate board or 
managerial employees.  Understanding the system itself as contributing to the discriminatory 
problem, like the overcrowded population in Plata or the segregated schools in Swann, explains 
the need to target the system for a remedy.  Understanding feminist theories of power – either as 
gaining women access to that power resource or in ending its patriarchal domination over women 
                                                 
83 563 US 493 (2011). 
84 Id. 
85 Thomas, Prophylactic Remedy, supra; DAVID LEVINE, DAVID JUNG & TRACY A. THOMAS, REMEDIES: PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE (West 5th ed. 2009). 
86 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
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– clarifies why the power structure is part of the causal nexus of the harm that appropriately is 
included with judicial prophylaxis.  Moreover, a quota, like other prophylactic measures, is 
pragmatically easy.  Release 30,000 prisoners or hire 50% women: the orders are finite, 
objective, and capable of implementation.  Or as the Court said in Swann, “feasible and 
workable.”  Ultimately, this is why judges like prophylaxis: it gives them a concrete remedial 
option that can provide effective relief in a meaningful way.90 
 
B.  Constitutional Legitimacy 
A second legal question as to the validity of gender quotas is whether ordering such 
gender-specific relief would violate constitutional parameters of equal protection as seen in the 
affirmative action cases.91  U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the race context seemed to have 
foreclosed most affirmative action remedies like quotas in education and employment.92  
Conditioning state action based on race is said to be discriminatory and trigger strict scrutiny, 
thereby justifying little state action.93  “’To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions 
program cannot use a quota system,’ but instead must ‘remain flexible enough to ensure that 
each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant's race or 
                                                 
90 See Thomas, Continued Vitality, supra; Golden, supra (explaining practical value of prophylactic injunctions in 
patent context). 
91 Alstott, supra, at 40. 
92 Parents Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); 
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93 Fisher v. University of Texas, 570 U.S. ___, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013), remanded to, 758 F.3d 633, 5th Cir. (2014) 
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ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.’”94 Race, however, can still be used as one 
factor in decisions like university admissions.95   
On the other hand, the European Court of Justice has upheld gender quotas against claims 
that they violate equality dictates.96  The “ECJ's jurisprudence has reinforced the notion that 
gender quotas can only be narrowly justified by the goal of eradicating women's disadvantage.  
Particularly when women's underrepresentation in certain positions is explained by 
prejudice, stereotype, or other practices associated with women's traditional exclusion from 
working life, quotas tend to be upheld.”97  “Quotas are a mechanism for combating and undoing 
the history and present complex structures of women's subordination.”98  Not all countries 
agreed, as courts in France struck down gender quotas as a remedy for past sex discrimination.99   
In the U.S., the question turns in large part on application of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause as to whether a judicial remedy of a gender quota would 
itself constitute discrimination.  One key distinction between gender and race quotas is that the 
constitutional standards for sex discrimination have been distinguished from those for race.100  
The Supreme Court has applied only intermediate, not strict, scrutiny to sex-based 
classifications.101  While arguments have been made over the years that sex is akin to race in its 
immutable and stereotypical function, and thus should demand the same level of strict scrutiny, 
                                                 
94 Fisher, 133 S.Ct. at 2418 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334, 123 S.Ct. 2325 (2003)). 
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the Court has stuck to is different standard for women.102  As a result, the Court has shown a 
greater tolerance for sex-based action, articulating a need to protect women or acknowledge 
gendered differences.103  The constitutional standard has been interpreted by the Court to require 
women’s admission to the avenues of power.  Thus, in United States v. Virginia, the Court held 
that the Virginia Military Institute must grant women equal access to the military education, not 
simply provide them a separate school.104   
What the intermediate standard of constitutional scrutiny might mean in the quota context 
is that sex-based action might be more tolerable than race-based action.105  Perhaps this is the 
silver lining of the double-standard of intermediate scrutiny.  For the Court's gender 
jurisprudence has recognized “the transformative potential of affirmative action” and how it 
“best advances the antisubordination goal of the equal protection guarantee.”106 Courts would 
need to identify important (but not compelling) interests justifying the sex-based action.  These 
important interests could be derived from women’s non-representative lack of power, continued 
subordination, lack of autonomy, and other systemic effects well-established in the feminist 
literature, and interests in equity, proportional representation, or balanced power which have 
driven the other global reforms.107   
This important objective of reversing gendered and discriminatory systems by mandating 
shared parity of power differentiates the case of gender quotas from the women-only policy 
                                                 
102 Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533; Frontiero, 411 U.S. 677. 
103 E.g., Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 533 US 53 (2001) (immigration mother preference); 
Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (statutory rape). 
104 518 U.S. at 533. 
105 Queresh, supra, at 799; Jason M. Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under United States v. 
Virginia’s “Exceedingly Persuasive Justification” Standard, 86 CAL. L. REV. 1169, 1171 (1998); contra Somani, 
supra, at 1453. 
106 Rosalind Berger Levinson, Gender-Based Affirmative Action and Reverse Gender Bias: Beyond Gratz, Parents 
Involved, and Ricci, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 1 (2011). 
107 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975).   
  
22 
 
struck down in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.108  There, a state university’s 
nursing program was open only to women.109  The state claimed that its single-sex admission 
policy “compensates for discrimination against women, and therefore constitutes educational 
affirmative action.”110 The Court noted, significantly, that such a justification could be an 
important governmental interest.  “In limited circumstances, a gender-based classification 
favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and directly assists members of the sex that is 
disproportionately burdened.”111  However, in Hogan, the Court found that this compensatory 
remedial purpose was not in fact the state’s objective. “Mississippi has made no showing that 
women lacked opportunities to obtain training in the field of nursing or to attain positions of 
leadership in that field when the MUW School of Nursing opened its door, or that women 
currently are deprived of such opportunities.”112 “Rather than compensate for discriminatory 
barriers faced by women, MUW's policy of excluding males from admission to the School of 
Nursing tends to perpetuate the stereotyped view of nursing as an exclusively woman's job.”113 
In addition, the Court found that “MUW's admissions policy lends credibility to the old view that 
women, not men, should become nurses, and makes the assumption that nursing is a field for 
women a self-fulfilling prophecy.”114  Thus, the constitutional infirmity with the all-women 
policy in Hogan was that it was not remedial, not aimed at reversing systemic inequality, but 
rather to the contrary, impermissibly perpetuated gendered stereotypes. 
Where affirmative remediation is the legitimate objective, the Supreme Court has upheld 
quota-like gender preferences.  In Johnson v. Transportation Agency, the Court upheld an 
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affirmative action plan of a county employer granting promotion preference to a woman against 
challenge under Title VII.115  The country adopted the plan because “mere prohibition of 
discriminatory practices is not enough to remedy the effects of past practices and to permit 
attainment of an equitable representation of minorities, women and handicapped persons.”116  It’s 
“goal” (specifically designated as the softer term “goal” rather than “quota”) was to achieve “a 
statistically measurable yearly improvement in hiring, training and promotion of minorities and 
women” by the use of a “benchmark by which to evaluate progress,” working toward a long-term 
goal where its work force matched the gender composition of the area labor force, 36%.117  At 
the time, only 22% of the employees were women, two-thirds of them clerical, only 8% women 
in administration, 7% in technical, and none in the position of the skill craft worker challenged in 
the lawsuit.118  The Court upheld using the gender preference as one of the factors of 
employment, citing the statistical imbalance and underrepresentation of women.119  It did not, the 
Court said, “unnecessarily trammel[] the rights of male employees or create[] an absolute bar to 
their advancement” because positions still remained available for men (64%) and candidates, 
both men and women, still had to be qualified for the position.120   
Taking these cases together, the Court has shown a willingness to consider quotas in the 
gender context.  While it has not had the question presented directly, the Court has at least, not 
closed the door to gender parity.  Instead, as in any heightened constitutional scrutiny, it 
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demands close and careful application of the constitutional standards to ensure that gender 
preferences are not pretexts nor avenues for future discrimination.121  
   
IV. Conclusion 
Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2016, Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau continued to advocate embracing feminism in order to effectuate change in politics and 
business.122  He predicted that by looking back, we might begin to see the need for change more 
clearly.  “Even within our own society, if you look back 50 years or if you leaf through a 
magazine from the 70s, you see horrific sexism that is overt in a way that would be unacceptable 
today.”123  The same might hold true, he suggested, in the future. “Even today, hopefully 20 
years from now, people will look at what we think is acceptable today and find it horrifically off-
base.”124 
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